Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 352
Cover Image
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
Oyama, Daisuke; Sandholm, William H.; Tercieux, Olivier - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 1, pp. 243-281
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673541
Cover Image
Robust equilibria under non-common priors
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - In: Journal of economic theory 145 (2010) 2, pp. 752-784
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003972876
Cover Image
Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - In: Journal of economic theory 144 (2009) 4, pp. 1726-1769
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003876957
Cover Image
On the strategic impact of an event under non-common priors
Oyama, Daisuke; Tercieux, Olivier - In: Games and economic behavior 74 (2012) 1, pp. 321-331
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009511668
Cover Image
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
Sandholm, William H.; Tercieux, Olivier; Oyama, Daisuke - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1, pp. 243-281
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599540
Cover Image
Sampling Best Response Dynamics and Deterministic Equilibrium Selection
Oyama, Daisuke; Sandholm, William H.; Tercieux, Olivier - 2014
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014174095
Cover Image
Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection
Sandholm, William H.; Tercieux, Olivier; Oyama, Daisuke - In: Theoretical Economics 10 (2015) 1
We consider a model of evolution in games in which a revising agent observes the actions of a random number of randomly sampled opponents and then chooses a best response to the distribution of actions in the sample. We provide a condition on the distribution of sample sizes under which an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145597
Cover Image
History versus expectations in economic geography reconsidered
Oyama, Daisuke - In: Journal of economic dynamics & control 33 (2009) 2, pp. 394-408
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003810055
Cover Image
Agglomeration under forward-looking expectations : potentials and global stability
Oyama, Daisuke - In: Regional science & urban economics 39 (2009) 6, pp. 688-695
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003920819
Cover Image
Rationalizable foresight dynamics
Matsui, Akihiko; Oyama, Daisuke - In: Games and economic behavior 56 (2006) 2, pp. 299-322
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003344072