behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion … potential blackmail threat between the colluding parties. However, careful use of whistle-blowing allows the principal to …

behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion … potential blackmail threat between the colluding parties. However, careful use of whistle-blowing allows the principal to …

behavior, that takes the form of collusion or blackmail, on the part of members of a simple hierarchical structure. We focus on …-blowing, creates incentives for the uninformed colluding party to walk out of the side deal and report to the principal that collusion … potential blackmail threat between the colluding parties. However, careful use of whistle-blowing allows the principal to …

collusion and capture between middle managers and line workers; provided that this detrimental form of collusion takes place in … principal to compensate the uninformed colluding party for walking out of collusion and for using/reporting the information … and prevents collusion at a reduced cost. …

stand to benefit by allowing supervisor-agent collusion. This benefit may even prompt the principal to actively encourage … collusion by hiring a dishonest supervisor in strict preference over an honest supervisor. …

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in …

, when rescaling is feasible, private monitoring is more efficient than public monitoring subject to collusion because … nonmonetary penalties are ineffective to deter collusion …