Showing 51 - 60 of 184
A conservation good (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or cut), but a buyer benefits more from conservation. The seller does conserve if the buyer is expected to buy, but the buyer is unwilling to pay as long as the seller conserves. This contradiction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317040
Inspired by the negotiations leading up to the Paris Agreement on climate change, I study a bargaining game where every party is proposing only its own contribution, before the set of pledges must be unanimously approved. I show that, with uncertain tolerance for delay, each equilibrium pledge...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014540996
I study dynamic private provision of public goods (or bads) when agents (or countries) can invest in cost-reducing technologies and sign incomplete contracts. The model leads to a dynamic common pool problem that is more severe than its static counter-part. Nevertheless, a sequence of short-term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266261
For a club such as the European Union, an important question is when, and under which conditions, a subset of the members should be allowed to form inner clubs and enhance cooperation. Flexible cooperation allows members to participate if and only if they benefit, but it generates a freerider...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266291
When making collektive desicions, principals (voters or districts) typically benefit by strategically delegating their bargaining and voting power to representatives different from themselves. There are conflicting views in the literature, however, of whether such a delegate should be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266308
Tradable permits are celebrated as a political instrument since they allow (i) firms to equalize marginal abatement costs through trade and (ii) the government to distribute the burden of the policy in a politically fair and feasible way. These two concerns, however, conflict in a dynamic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266310
I develop a dynamic model of private provision of public bads allowing investments in technologies. The analysis is tractable and the MPE unique. The framework is used to derive optimal incomplete contracts in a dynamic setting. While the noncooperative equilibrium is very inefficient,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274837
If a coalition of countries implements climate policies, nonparticipants tend to consume more, pollute more, and invest too little in renewable energy sources. In response, the coalition's equilibrium policy distorts trade and it is not time consistent. By adding a market for the right to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326729
This paper explores how a principal with time-inconsistent preferences invests optimally in technology or capital. If the current principal prefers her future self to save more, she can increase current investments complementary to future savings and decrease investments in the strategic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328803
Private politics are often introduced by market participants in the absence of public regulation. But when is private politics enough, efficient, or better than administratively costly public regulation? We present a novel framework in which we can study the interaction between regulation,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011335453