We develop a theoretical model to analyze the effects of libertarian paternalism on information production and financial decision making. Individuals in our model appreciate the information content of the recommendations made by a social planner. This affects their incentive to gather...

We calculate equilibria of dynamic double-auction markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors are segmented into groups that differ with respect to characteristics determining information...

We study the "percolation" of information of common interest through a large market as agents encounter and reveal information to each other over time. We provide an explicit solution for the dynamics of the cross-sectional distribution of posterior beliefs. We also show that convergence of the...

We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through both public and private observation of other agents' actions. We provide an explicit solution for the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs. When the private learning channel is present, we show that convergence of the...

We study equilibria of dynamic over-the-counter markets in which agents are distinguished by their preferences and information. Over time, agents are privately informed by bids and offers. Investors differ with respect to information quality, including initial information precision, and also in...

We study information percolation in a stylized over-the-counter market in which a large set of asymmetrically informed investors meet in small groups over time, exchanging information with their counterparties when matched, through for example their bids for an asset. We provide an explicit...

We solve for the equilibrium dynamics of information sharing in a large population. Each agent is endowed with signals regarding the likely outcome of a random variable of common concern. Individuals choose the effort with which they search for others from whom they can gather additional...

We calculate learning rates when agents are informed through public and private observation of other agents' actions. We characterize the evolution of the distribution of posterior beliefs. If the private learning channel is present, convergence of the distribution of beliefs to the...