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Delegation and Commitment in Durable Goods Monopolies

Coury, Tarek; Petkov, Vladimir P. - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2007

This paper studies a simultaneous-move infinite-horizon delegation game in which the principal of a durable goods … delegation contract allows for continual interference with managerial incentives: in each period the principal rewards the … manager according to her performance. We show that when the cost of delegation is low relative to profits, the principal can …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047825

Collusive Effects of a Monopolist's Use of an Intermediary to Deliver to Retailers

Teichmann, Isabel; Schlippenbach, Vanessa von - DIW Berlin (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung) - 2014

A manufacturer contracting secretly with several downstream competitors faces an opportunism problem, preventing it from exerting its market power. In an infinitely repeated game, the opportunism problem can be relaxed. We show that the upstream firm's market power can be restored even further...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011122315

Our product is unique: A note on a delegation game with differentiated products

Buchen, Clemens; Hartmann, Sven A.; Palermo, Alberto - 2021

consider a delegation game, for which the owner of a firm hires a manager who acts as if the good has a lower degree of … design an incentive scheme accordingly, which leads the manager to act in this way. Both firms rely on delegation. We discuss …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012598736

Our product is unique : a note on a delegation game with differentiated products

Buchen, Clemens; Hartmann, Sven A.; Palermo, Alberto - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012595219

Sales-Maximization vs. Profit-Maximization: Managerial Behavior at Japanese Regional Banks 1980-2009

Harimaya, Kozo; Ohkawa, Takao; Okamura, Makoto; … - School of Economics, Kwansei Gakuin University - 2012

In this paper, we analyze the managerial behavior of firms by estimating a nested objective function consistent with the framework of Fershtman and Judd (1987). Using data for Japanese regional banks for FY 1980-FY 2009, we focus on oligopolistic behavior in the domestic loan market and examine...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010902086

Strategic delegation in two-sided markets

Ribeiro, Vitor Miguel - Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto - 2014

In a two-sided market duopoly, we investigate the effects of delegating long run restrictive and unrestrictive decisions to managers by the platforms' owners, the effects of the platforms' ownership establishing long run decisions without managers and the impacts of asymmetric regimes between...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010842618

Managerial Incentives and Competition with Fully Stratecic Principals: Comments on Raith

Scalera, Domenico; Zazzaro, Alberto - Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Sociali, Facoltà … - 2004

We present a solution for a three stage spatial competition model that does not require restrictive assumptions on price expectations. This allows us to generalize the Raith (2003) model to the case where principals behave in a fully strategic fashion both in the price and in the compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029066

Spatial competition and the duration of managerial incentive contracts

Bárcena-Ruiz, Juan Carlos; Casado-Izaga, F. Javier - In: Investigaciones Economicas 29 (2005) 2, pp. 331-349

We consider a duopoly model of spatial competition in which the owners of the firms can strategically use two variables: the duration of managerial incentive contracts and the location of the firms. In equilibrium, one owner chooses a long-term incentive contract for his manager (becoming a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005736134

Progressive managerial bonuses in a spatial Bertrand duopoly.

Bakó, Barna; Kálecz-Simon, András - In: Society and Economy 35 (2013) December, pp. 531-538

The relationship of managerial bonuses and profit maximization is interesting both from an economic and a managerial viewpoint. Our contribution to this literature is showing that progressive managerial bonuses can increase profits in a spatial Bertrand competition, and furthermore they can help...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010822349

Should Owners of Firms Delegate Long-run Decisions?

Ruiz, Bárcena; Carlos, Juan; Izaga, Casado; Javier, … - Departamento de Economía Aplicada III (Econometría y … - 1999

of the firm) to themselves. In this context we show that the delegation of short-run decisions (prices) to the managers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005121332