What factors determine support for digital governance solutions? And do autocracies differ from democracies in the way the population evaluates digitization initiatives by the state? Building on previous studies, we hypothesize that gaps in the quality of public services and information...

The OECD’s new Public Integrity Indicators offer a credible alternative to existing corruption-related indices, as they draw directly on data from member countries instead of expert views. The indicators unpack the general notion of corruption into specific integrity risks and measure the...

We use high-quality panel data on corruption convictions, new panels of assistant U.S. attorneys and relative public sector wages, and careful attention to the consequences of modeling endogeneity to estimate the impact of prosecutorial resources on criminal convictions of those who undertake...

This study focuses on institutional choices in fighting against corruption. The article first compares and contrasts two institutional options in organizing the struggle against corruption: a single, powerful organization versus multiplicity of organizations, highlighting advantages and...

Local communities are suffering extreme financial and economic hardships due to falling revenues and increased expenditures and therefore must seek alternate means to balance their budgets. A very large expenditure that must be borne by every community is the administration of the Criminal...

Resumen: La corrupción se puede definir como "el abuso de la autoridad o confianza pública con fines privados". Sin embargo, esta definición sugiere que la corrupción es una enfermedad de la sociedad y no un síntoma resultante de problemas estructurales como la inequidad o falta de...

Bu çalışmanın odağında yolsuzlukla mücadelede kurumsal seçenekler konusu bulunmaktadır. Yazıda ilk olarak yolsuzlukla mücadelede yetkili tek bir kurum olması durumu ile birden fazla kurumun yetkili olduğu bir kurumsal yapının üstünlükleri ve zayıflıkları ana hatlarıyla ele...

Over time, inspection agencies gather information about firms that cause harmful externalities. This information may allow agencies to differentiate their monitoring strategies in the future, since inspections can be influenced by firms' past performance relative to other competitors in the...

I study political competition between two candidates who could differ in their ability, popularity, and ethics. In elections, each candidate proposes a flat (income) tax rate and a public good level. A high(er)-ability candidate can produce the public good using less funds. Collected taxes that...

Using a theoretical model of two-candidate political competition under probabilistic voting, I study the effectiveness of the following anti-corruption reforms: (i) higher wages for politicians, (ii) higher penalties for political corruption, and (iii) constitutional constraints on the tax rates...