Managers have a variety of tools at their disposal to influence stakeholder perceptions. Earnings management and the strategic reporting of non‐GAAP earnings are just two of the available menu choices. We explore how real earnings management and accruals management influence the probability...

Despite the apparent importance of ‘‘street earnings'' to investors, we know relatively little about the process through which this earnings metric is determined. The limited evidence in the extant literature provides analyst-centric explanations, suggesting that analysts' abilities and...

Researchers frequently proxy for managers' non‐GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP‐provided earnings are a valid proxy for managers' non‐GAAP reporting, however, has been debated...

Researchers frequently proxy for managers' non-GAAP disclosures using performance metrics available through analyst forecast data providers (FDPs), such as I/B/E/S. The extent to which FDP data is a valid proxy for managers' non-GAAP reporting, however, has been debated extensively. We explore...

We examine analysts' GAAP earnings forecasts and illustrate their usefulness in two prominent research settings. First, we find that the availability of GAAP forecasts has increased dramatically since 2003, and they are now available for most I/B/E/S-covered firms. Next, we utilize GAAP...

We examine how exogenous changes in analyst coverage influence the likelihood that managers will voluntarily disclose customized (non-GAAP) performance metrics and the relative quality of their non-GAAP reporting. Specifically, we use a quasi-natural-experimental setting in which brokerage firms...

Researchers typically infer real earnings management when a firm's operating and investing activities differ from industry norms. One significant problem with classifying deviations from industry averages as “earnings management” is that companies can change their operating and investing...

We investigate whether firms change their non-GAAP reporting practices after debt covenant violations. We find that the likelihood that a firm will disclose non-GAAP earnings decreases and (for those that continue to disclose) the quality of non-GAAP reporting improves following covenant...

We compare non-GAAP EPS in annual earnings announcements and proxy statements using hand-collected data from SEC filings. We find that proxies for capital market incentives (contracting incentives) are more highly associated with disclosure of non-GAAP EPS in annual earnings announcements (proxy...

We investigate two potential deterrents of aggressive pro forma reporting. First, the design of compensation contracts can encourage managers to adopt either a short- or a long-term focus. While it is difficult to observe whether compensation contracts are tied directly to pro forma earnings...