We study equilibrium determination in an environment where two kinds of agents have different information sets: The fully informed agents know the structure of the model and observe histories of all exogenous and endogenous variables. The less informed agents observe only a strict subset of the...

The target problem considers the central bank's use of optimal tools and targets for purposes of stabilization and welfare optimization. In this study, this question is answered anew in a microfounded approach. By adding imperfect information to the model of [Berentsen and Waller, 2011], a...

The article compares the social efficiency of monetary targeting and inflation targeting when central banks may have private information on shocks to money demand and the transparency solution is not feasible because of verifiability problems. Under inflation targeting and monetary targeting,...

We study the response of stock prices to monetary policy, distinguishing effects of exogenous shocks from "Delphic" shocks that reveal the Federal Reserve's macroeconomic forecasts. To decompose monetary policy surprises into these separate components we construct a measure of Federal Reserve...

This paper presents a model in which investors, acting in self-interest, force interest rates to the levels desired by the monetary authority. If interest rates move out of line with those required by the monetary authority, a statement (an open mouth operation) is all that is needed to restore...

This note reviews the signaling models presented in the monetary economics literature, and offers a supplementary interpretation regarding the observed U.S. Treasury primacy in signaling. It is argued here that the legal authority given to the U.S. Treasury, under the Gold Reserve Act of 1934,...