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In this note we extend Jackson and WattsJET2002''s result on the coincidence of S-stochastically stable and core stable networks from the marriage problem to the solvable roommate problem. In particular, we show that the polarization structure of the marriage problem on which the proof of...
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We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincideswith the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g.,for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005670185
We extend Jackson and Watts's (2002) result on the coincidence of S-stochastically stable and core stable networks from marriage problems to roommate problems. In particular, we show that the existence of a side-optimal core stable network, on which the proof of Jackson and Watts (2002) hinges,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005582656
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010626783
In this note we study von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets for Shapley and Scarf (1974) housing markets. Kawasaki (2010) shows that the set of competitive allocations coincides with the unique von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set based on a farsighted version of antisymmetric weak...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008870897
We show that for any roommate market the set of stochastically stable matchings coincides with the set of absorbing matchings. This implies that whenever the core is non-empty (e.g., for marriage markets), a matching is in the core if and only if it is stochastically stable, i.e., stochastic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008860947
We show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents' preferences satisfy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851401
Scheduling jobs of decentralized decision makers that are in competition will usually lead to cost inefficiencies. This cost inefficiency is studied using the Price of Anarchy (PoA), i.e., the ratio between the worst Nash equilibrium cost and the cost attained at the centralized optimum. First,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851455