Exchange economies in which preferences of some consumers are possibly satiated are considered. In a general model of an atomless exchange economy, the equivalence between the ‘rejective’ core and the set of dividend equilibrium allocations is proved by applying Liapunov’s theorem in...

We propose an estimator of change point in the long memory parameter d of an ARFIMA(p, d, q) process using the sup Wald test. We derive the consistency and the rate of convergence of the parameter. The convergence rate of our change point estimator depends on the magnitude of a shift....

The paper investigates the possibility of decline in the persistence of real exchange rates, or deviations from PPP. To this end, we test the null hypothesis of no decline in the PPP deviation persistence between two subsamples using a fractional integration framework. In addition, our...

A dynamic economy with markets of equities and bonds is considered. The rational expectations equilibrium is defined in an asset pricing model and a condition under which the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds is shown. In an aggregate model the existence of a rational expectations equilibrium is...

We show that the value of a zero-sum Bayesian game is a Lipschitz continuous function of the players' common prior belief, with respect to the total variation metric (that induces the topology of setwise convergence on beliefs). This is unlike the case of general Bayesian games, where lower...

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We investigate a pure exchange atomless economy under uncertainty with emphasis on an epistemic point of view, where the traders are assumed to have a non-partitional information structure. We propose a generalized notion of rational expectations equilibrium for the economy and we show the core...

Although transition to entrepreneurship is a central subject in entrepreneurial studies, there is little research on its link with previous employer firm size. This study examines this relationship by utilizing a rich data set representing the entire Taiwanese labor market. While we found that...

The purpose of this article is to investigate epistemic conditions for a sequential equilibrium in an extensive form game with imperfect information: If players mutually know that all players maximize their own expected payoffs at any information sets in their final decisions then their...

In this study, a participation game in a mechanism to implement a public project is considered; in this game, agents decide simultaneously whether they will participate in the mechanism or not. We characterize the sets of participants at strict Nash equilibria, strong equilibria, and...