This study investigates how regulatory ability and banking market structure affect explicit deposit insurance scheme (eDIS) adoption and banks' risk taking under eDIS. We find that:(i) The regulatory ability exists a threshold if the government regulator's regulatory ability above the threshold,...

Does high leverage incentivize banks to systematically originate and hold riskier loans? I construct a novel data set consisting of 3 million small business and home mortgage loans, matched to the specific banks that originated them and verified to be held on bank portfolios, rather than sold. I...

Restrictions on stock ownership may harm a company's performance because restrictions prevent owners from choosing an optimal structure. We examine the stock-price performance and ownership structure of a sample of thrift institutions that converted from mutual to stock ownership. We find that,...

This study examines the relevance of bank board structure on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (1,534 observations), this study finds that strong bank boards (boards reflecting more of bank shareholders interest) particularly small and less...

The purpose of this paper is to assess and promote safe and sound banking systems, including the policy, legal and regulatory framework which affects developing countries' banking systems, especially in terms of the range of institutions and products available, their financial performance and...

This paper tests the effect of the establishment of risk management committee on bank risk, bank loan performance and bank value. The Dodd Frank Act of 2010 provides us with quasi-experimental variation on risk management committee establishment that facilitates identification. I present two...

The main result of the quick reactions of the Federal Reserve (the Fed) and the European Central Bank (ECB) to the Covid-19 crisis are that more than 20% of their public debt is now held by these central banks and that the balance sheet of the ECB is now near 50% of GDP (33% for the Fed). Two...

We develop a tractable model of strategic debt renegotiation in which businesses are sequentially interconnected through their liabilities. This financing structure, which we refer to as a "debt chain", gives rise to externalities, as a lender's willingness to provide concessions to his...

Black and Cox (1976) claim that the value of junior debt is increasing in asset risk when the firm's value is low. We show, using closed-form solution, that the junior debt's value is hump-shaped. This has interesting implications for the market-discipline role of banks' junior debt (subdebt)

When banks extend loans to each other, they generate a negative externality in the form of systemic risk. They create a network of interbank exposures by which they expose other banks to potential insolvency cascades. In this paper, we show how a regulator can use information about the financial...