This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...

This paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on perfect foresight dynamics. A normal form game is played repeatedly in a large society of rational agents. There are frictions: opportunities to revise actions follow independent Poison processes. Each agent forms his belief...

We randomly draw a game from a distribution on the set of two-player games with a given size. We compute the distribution and the expectation of the number of pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the game conditional on the game having nondecreasing best-response functions. The conditional expected...

This paper presents a sufficient condition for the quasi-acyclic condition. A game is quasi-acyclic if from any strategy profile, there exists a finite sequence of strict best replies that ends in a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The best-reply dynamics must converge to a pure strategy Nash...

We introduce the class of anti-coordination games. A symmetric two-player game is said to have the anti-coordination property if, for any mixed strategy, any worst response to the mixed strategy is in the support of the mixed strategy. Every anti-coordination game has a unique symmetric Nash...

The paper studies equilibrium selection in supermodular games based on a class of perfect foresight dynamics, introduced by Matsui and Matsuyama (JET 1995) and further developed by Hofbauer and Sorger (JET 1999, IGTR 2002) and Oyama (JET 2002). A normal form game is played repeatedly in a large...