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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150918
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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005150923
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The Paradox of New Members: Strategic Foundations and Experimental Evidence
Drouvelis, Michalis; Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2007
Power indices suggest that adding new members to a voting body may affect the balance of power between the original …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010652413
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Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study
Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2005
voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule … this effect using laboratory experiments. Participants propose and vote on how to divide a budget according to weighted … majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005453699
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Enlargement and the Balance of Power: an Experimental Study
Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics … - 2005
voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule … this effect using laboratory experiments. Participants propose and vote on how to divide a budget according to weighted … majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010601967
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Enlargement and the Balance of Power: An Experimental Study
Montero, Maria; Sefton, Martin; Zhang, Ping - EconWPA - 2005
voting body may affect the balance of power between the original members even if their number of votes and the decision rule … this effect using laboratory experiments. Participants propose and vote on how to divide a budget according to weighted … majority voting rules, and we measure the voting power of a player by his average payoff in the experiment. By comparing voting …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005556685
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Motives of sanctioning: Equity and emotions in a public good experiment with punishment
Crosetto, Paolo; Güth, Werner; Mittone, Luigi; Ploner, … - 2012
We study conditional cooperation based on a sequential two-person linear public good game in which a trusting first contributor can be exploited by a second contributor. After playing this game the first contributor is allowed to punish the second contributor. The consequences of sanctioning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291837
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Reputational concerns in repeated rent-seeking contests
Fallucchi, Francesco; Renner, Elke - 2016
We experimentally investigate how reputational concerns affect behavior in repeated Tullock contests by comparing expenditures of participants interacting in fixed groups with the expenditures of participants interacting with randomly changing opponents. When participants receive full...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011688530
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Planning ahead: eliciting intentions and beliefs in a public goods game
González, Luis G.; Levati, Maria Vittoria - 2007
In a two-person ¯nitely repeated public goods experiment, we use intentions data to interpret individual behavior. Based on a random-utility model speci¯cation, we develop a relationship between a player's beliefs about others' behavior and his contributions' plans, and use this relationship...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275035
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An experiment on the Nash program: Comparing two strategic mechanisms implementing the Shapley value
Chessa, Michela; Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Lardon, Aymeric; … - 2022
We experimentally compare two well-known mechanisms inducing the Shapley value as an ex ante equilibrium outcome of a noncooperative bargaining procedure: the demand-basedWinter's demand commitment bargaining mechanism and the offer-based Hart and Mas-Colell procedure. Our results suggest that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013472330