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Students of comparative politics have long faced a vexing dilemma: how can social scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical examples? In Analytic Narratives, five senior scholars offer a new and ambitious methodological response to this important...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010862627
Students of comparative politics have long faced a vexing dilemma: how can social scientists draw broad, applicable principles of political order from specific historical examples? In Analytic Narratives, five senior scholars offer a new and ambitious methodological response to this important...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010606982
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012881667
In this study, we develop a theory to understand how groups with strong divisions may, paradoxically, help members to cope with conflict and injustice. We test our theoretical predictions using a survey methodology and the data from 72 work groups across different industries. Consistent with our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014203155
This article proposes a reading of the armed conflict from an evolutionary design that takes into account the concept of private protection agencies in the works of Schelling/Nozick/Gambetta. Their aim is to assess the dynamics of conflict and changes from its author's scientific output. A...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014159027
The document presents an economic model of the insurgency in Colombia like an economically rational illegal activity. The situation is modelled like a dynamic game, whose protagonists are the government, the rebel leader and the farmers. First, the government determines the level of the military...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014147754
We study whether the Coase conjecture holds in a model of bargaining during conflict due to Powell and Fearon. Two players, A and B, contest a divisible resource. At any time during the conflict, they can make a binding agreement to share the resource. The conflict continues until they make an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014451286