We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining … periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods …

We investigate a random proposer bargaining game with a dead line. A bounded time interval is divided into bargaining … periods of equal length and we study the limit of the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome as the number of bargaining periods …

, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining … solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on TU-bargaining games where they coincide. The fourth axiom is a … of Nash's IIA-axiom that together with the three standard axioms suffices to characterize the Nash bargaining solution …

, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining … solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on TU-bargaining games where they coincide. The fourth axiom is a … of Nash's IIA-axiom that together with the three standard axioms suffices to characterize the Nash bargaining solution …

, 1953) for two-person bargaining games. Three of these axioms are standard and are shared by several popular bargaining … solutions. They suffice to characterize these solutions on TU-bargaining games where they coincide. The fourth axiom is a … of Nash's IIA-axiom that together with the three standard axioms suffices to characterize the Nash bargaining solution …

Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as … attempts. We experimentally compare three protocols of concession bargaining, the normal form or static one, the one where …