Consider a choice between two random variables, for which only means and variances are known. Is it possible to rank them by putting some constraints on risk preferences? We provide such a ranking by bounding how much marginal utility can change. Such bounds enable us to rank all distributions...

We consider dynamic cooperative games, where the worth of coalitions varies over time according to the history of allocations. When defining the core of a dynamic game, we allow the possibility for coalitions to deviate at any time and thereby to give rise to a new environment. A coalition that...

We consider a class of decision makers who have to choose among different random bundles of commodities. It is assumed that they maximize expected utility, and their utility functions depend only on the monetary value of the bundles of commodities. Stochastic dominance conditions are provided...

We consider k agents who have different subjective probabilities and are utility maximizers. A planner, who knows the beliefs of the agents, maximizes the social expected utility, which is increasing and symmetric in the utilities of the agents. She does that by optimally stopping the flow of...

The sequence ≥nd of nth degree stochastic dominances for d-dimensional distribution functions is defined. It is shown that, under some regularity conditions, ≥nd implies ≥nd−1 for the (d−1) - dimensional marginals. Also some necessary conditions for ≥nd are established. These...

This book contains full bibliographic information (inclusive keywords) aboutthe literature on Stochastic Orderings and their Applications in the following fields: Choice under Risk, Finance, Inequality, Measurement, Economic Theory, Special Economic Applications, Decision Methodology, Queueing,...