<Para ID="Par1">This paper provides assumptions for a limit Folk theorem in stochastic games with finite horizon. In addition to the asymptotic assumptions à la Dutta (J Econ Theory 66:1–32, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1995</CitationRef>) I present an additional assumption under which the Folk theorem holds in stochastic games when the horizon is...</citationref></para>

The paper introduces and discusses some of the most important conceptual ideas in game theory by exploring their implicit answer to the question: Who is a player? It will be illustrated that some of the most celebrated results in game theory rely on different notions of a player, global players...

Binmore's Natural Justiceoffers an evolutionary approach to morality, in which moral rules form a cultural system that is robust and evolutionarily stable. The folk theorem is the analytical basis for his theory of justice. I argue that this is a mistake, as the equilibria described by the folk...

This 2012 perspective of the 1987 Palgrave entry on ‘turnpike theory’ highlights the subsequent development of the subject in the light of a critical re-reading of the original. It distinguishes the 1949 conception, a response of Samuelson to a 1945 von Neumann challenge to the...

This paper argues that the efficiency distribution of players in a game determines how aggressively these players interact.We formalize the idea of balance of power: players fight very inefficient players but play softly versus equally (or more) efficient players.This theory of conduct predicts...

We prove a folk theorem for multiplayer games in continuous time when players observe a public signal distorted by Brownian noise. The proof is based on a rigorous foundation for such continuous-time multiplayer games. We study in detail the relation between behaviour and mixed strategies, and...

We consider repeated games with complete information and imperfect monitoring, where each player is assigned a fixed subset of players and only observes the moves chosen by the players in this subset. This structure is naturally represented by a directed graph. We prove that a generalized folk...

We study the effect of asynchronous choice structure on the possibility of cooperation in repeated strategic situations. We model the strategic situations as asynchronously repeated games, and define two notions of effective minimax value. We show that the order of players’ moves generally...

A canonical interpretation of an infinitely repeated game is that of a "dynastic" repeated game: a stage game repeatedly played by successive generations of finitely-lived players with dynastic preferences. These two models are in fact equivalent when the past history of play is observable to...

I show that in an infinitely repeated contest, collusion is easier to sustain when the players are more equal than when they are less equal. Therefore, aggregate rent-seeking expenditures may be lower when the contestants are more equally matched. This is in sharp contrast to the standard result...