We consider an infinite-horizon inter-generational economy with identical agents differing only in their inherited wealth and with a constant-returns-to-scale technology using capital and labour (called "effort") and displaying a purely idiosyncratic risk. If effort is contractible, full...

The standard algebra of experessing knowledge and common knowledge in game theory is critically examines. It is argued that this algebra is flawed because it assumes implicitly that information partitions of individuals are common knowledge, and that all individuals know all the truths of...

We consider an exchange economy with time-inconsistent consumers whose preferences are additively separable. When these consumers trade in a sequence of markets, their time-inconsistency may introduce a non-convexity that gives them an incentive to trade lotteries. If there are many consumers,...

The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

Duality methods of linear and convex programming are applied to impute definite marginal values to the fixed inputs of a hydroelectric plant from the operating profit. Our earlier analysis of pumped storage (of energy and other cyclically priced goods) is thus extended to valuation of an...

Using convex calculus, we extend the Wong-Viner Theorem to nondifferentiable costs by equating the capital inputs' rental prices to their profit-imputed marginal values. Thus extended, the short-run approach to LRMC pricing is applied to peak-load pricing with storage.