The present paper illustrates the coordination problem with a standard two-person non-cooperative gae, with yields two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, one of which is Pareto dominated by the other.

In repeated games with imperfect public monitoring, players can use public signals to perfectly coordinate their behavior. Our study of repeated games with imperfect private monitoring focusses on the coordination problem that arises without public signals.

If a solution (on a closed family of games) satisfies dummy axiom (DUM) and independance of irrelevant strategies (IIS) then it also satisfies consistency (CONS) (proposition 2.21, Peleg and Tijs, 1996). The converse of this proposition is not true: CONS implies neither DUM nor IIS as shown in...

This paper considers the dynamic evolution of algorithmic (recursive) learning rules in a normal form game. It is shown that the system - the population frequencies - is globally stable for any arbitrary N-player normal form game, if the evolutionary process is algorithmic and the "birth...

In this paper we formalize a new form of two-player game, that we call decision- form. A two-player decision-form game consists in a pair of decision rules, representing the rationality of each player. We develop the basic facts of this type of games, showing that this form of game generalizes...

The extant literature has used measurements of CEO risk-taking incentives which do not include the effects of termination provisions such as severance agreements. This paper provides a general form model that allows for the valuation and computation of CEO compensation structures including...

In Hawk-Dove games with mulitiplicity of equilibria, we study which equilibria are selected using various equilibrium selection methods. Using a uniform price auction as an illustrative example, we apply the tracing procedure method of Harsanyi and Selten (1988), the robustness to strategic...

A buyer procures a network to span a given set of nodes; each seller bids to supply certain edges, then the buyer purchases a minimal cost spanning tree. An efficient tree is constructed in any equilibrium of the Bertrand game.

We apply three equilibrium selection techniques to study which equilibrium is selected in a hawk-dove game with a multiplicity of equilibria. By using a uniform-price auction as an illustrative example, we find that when the demand in the auction is low or intermediate, the tracing procedure...

We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in auction settings with ‘rich' type spaces, where bidders obtain information from sources other than their own valuation. The focus of the paper is on the concept of Bayes-Nash implementation. By considering a relaxed problem, we provide an upper...