We study a sequential Bertrand game with one dominant market incumbent and multiple small entrants selling homogeneous products. Whilst the equilibrium for the case of a single entrant is well-known from Gelman and Salop (1983), we derive properties of the N-firm equilibrium and present an...

We experimentally study price-quantity competitions in duopoly and triopoly markets and compare the results with the respective mixed strategy equilibria. The equilibrium does not predict experimental outcomes adequately, but we find indications for a reactive strategy in the experiments.

We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases.

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a phenomenon of increasing interest. Today, it is practiced in most countries around the globe and studied in various fields of academia. However, the focus still lies on Western developed countries, their understanding, and implementation of CSR. This...

Positive effects of multimarket activities on cooperation between firms are widely acknowledged. We study these effects in a setting with home market asymmetries as is typical for global competition. In our multimarket duopoly experiment each firm has a home market but may also enter the other...

I study a game with one market incumbent and a small entrant in a duopoly with perfectly substitutable products. Firms face a sequential Bertrand competition. Limiting the initial capacity (Judo economics) is a plausible entry strategy for the small firm. If we, however, introduce asymmetry in...