The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal rate of money supply growth when a moral hazard problem in an insurance market makes the risk diversification incomplete. The analysis is based on a simple overlapping generations model of fiat money with idiosyncratic uncertainty. Without...

I study the incentives of Cournot duopolists to share their technologies with their competitor in markets where intellectual property rights are absent and imitation is costless. The trade-off between a signaling effect and an expropriation effect determines the technology-sharing incentives. In...

The paper has three main objectives. The first of these aims to clarify the term and the motivations behind such actions. The second objective is to circumscribe the identification of the legislative and institutional elements regarding whistle blowing, currently existing in Romania. The third...

This paper provides a signaling-game theoretical foundation for empirically testing the effects of quality report cards in the U.S. health care industry. It shows that, when health care providers face an identical distribution of patient illness severities, a trade-off between multidimensional...

Plott, Wit & Yang (2003) conduct a betting market experiment and nd: First, information was aggregated. This suggests that traders updated their private information based on observed market odds. Second, a model based only on the use of private information seems to fit their data best. The...

In this paper we examine the impact of tax contracts as a novel institution on elections, policies, and welfare. We consider a political game in which three parties compete to form the government. Parties have policy preferences about the level of public-good provision and benefit from perks...

I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information. (JEL: D23, D82, D86, L20) (c) 2010 by the European Economic Association.

We characterize optimal incentive contracts in a moral hazard framework extended in two directions. First, after effort provision, the agent is free to leave and pursue some ex-post outside option. Second, the value of this outside option is increasing in effort, and hence endogenous. Optimal...

This paper presents an incomplete information game of pricing and targeted advertising with vertically differentiated product. Firms have incomplete information about production costs and can inform consumers about price and product characteristics by either using the mass media, which reaches...

This paper focuses on testing providers' moral hazard caused by a health care report card policy. We argue that, to indicate providers' moral hazard, empirical approaches should be based on understanding that the policy may cause different sides of participants to take actions. Neglecting this,...