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Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement : An Empirical Analysis
Bajari, Patrick; McMillan, Robert Stanton; Tadelis, Steven - 2003
this question, we offer a framework that compares auctions with negotiations. We then examine a comprehensive data set of … limitations to the use of auctions. Auctions perform poorly when projects are complex and contractual design is incomplete …. Furthermore, auctions stifle communication between buyers and the sellers, preventing the buyer from utilizing the contractor …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014032747
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Provider Selection and Renegotiation Incentive of Incomplete Contracts : Empirical Relevance on Public Work Procurement
Guccio, Calogero - 2010
The literature on public procurement pays great attention to the rules underlying tendering procedures as well as on the specification of the type of contract to be awarded. Less attention has been paid to the incompleteness of the contract; this issue is relevant in the public work sector...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149716
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Public procurement design : lessons from the private sector
Tadelis, Steve - In: International journal of industrial organization 30 (2012) 3, pp. 297-302
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009658229
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Incentives Versus Transaction Costs : A Theory of Procurement Contracts
Tadelis, Steven; Bajari, Patrick - 2001
Inspired by facts from the private sector construction industry, we develop a model that explains many stylized facts of procurement contracts. The buyer in our model incurs a cost of providing a comprehensive design, and is faced with a trade-off between providing incentives and reducing ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014177424
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Incentives Versus Transaction Costs : A Theory of Procurement Contracts
Bajari, Patrick; Tadelis, Steven - 2001
Inspired by facts from the private sector construction industry, we develop a model that explains many stylized facts of procurement contracts. The buyer in our model incurs a cost of providing a comprehensive design, and is faced with a trade-off between providing incentives and reducing ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014128056
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When the highest bidder loses the auction: theory and evidence from public procurement
Decarolis, Francesco - Banca d'Italia - 2009
procurement auctions, run alternately using a form of the average bid auction or the augmented first price, to structurally … estimate the bids' verification cost, the firms' mark up and the inefficiency generated by the average bid auctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005029278
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Bidding for Incompete Contracts
Bajari, Patrick; Houghton, Stephanie; Tadelis, Steven - 2004
When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011325015
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Bidding for incompete contracts
Bajari, Patrick L.; Houghton, Stephanie; Tadelis, Steve - 2004
When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011607047
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Selezione dei fornitori e incentivi alla rinegoziazione in contratti incompleti:;rilevanza empirica nel settore dei lavori pubblici
GUCCIO, Calogero; PIGNATARO, Giacomo; RIZZO, Ilde - In: Rivista Italiana degli Economisti 14 (2009) 2, pp. 311-344
The literature on public procurement pays great attention to the rules underlying tendering procedures as well as on the specification of the type of contract to be awarded. Less attention has been paid to the incompleteness of the contract; this issue is relevant in the public work sector...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008629820
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Bidding for Incomplete Contracts
Bajari, Patrick; Houghton, Stephanie; Tadelis, Steven - 2005
When procurement contracts are incomplete, they are frequently changed after the contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This results in a final cost that differs from the initial price, and may involve significant transaction costs due to renegotiation. We propose a stylized model of bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014068407