research joint venture (RJV), non-cooperative RJV, and licensing. In the cooperative (non-cooperative) RJV, the firms (do not …) internalize R&D spillovers. We show that, for the domestic firm, the cooperative RJV dominates, and licensing is the least … desirable alternative. Although licensing is dominant for the foreign firm, it is not implementable. Both RJVs are implementable …

(RJV), non-cooperative RJV and licensing. In the cooperative (non-cooperative) RJV, the firms (do not) internalize R …&D spillovers. We show that, for the domestic firm, the cooperative RJV dominates and licensing is the least desirable alternative …. Although licensing is dominant for the foreign firm, it is not implementable. Both RJVs are implementable. While the non …

(RJV), non-cooperative RJV and licensing. In the cooperative (non-cooperative) RJV, the firms (do not) internalize R …&D spillovers. We show that, for the domestic firm, the cooperative RJV dominates and licensing is the least desirable alternative …. Although licensing is dominant for the foreign firm, it is not implementable. Both RJVs are implementable. While the non …

We examine the role of licensing agreements in facilitating collusive behavior. The focus is on how technology transfer … collusion often leads to less production, technology sharing of nondrastic, but sufficiently large, innovations can increase … welfare in an industry characterized by diseconomies of scale. We identify licensing agreements that will lead to an aggregate …