We model an innovator's choice of payment scheme and duration as a joint decision in a multi-period licensing game with potential sequential innovations and some irreversibility of technology transfer. We find that it may be optimal to license the innovation for less than the full length of the...

In this paper, we explore whether the alignment of the date a household receives Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) benefits with the start of the calendar month affects the smoothness of household monthly expenditures. Across states, what day in the calendar month households...

Abstract It has been shown recently that both card networks’ profits and consumer welfare are higher when the networks charge proportional fees than when they charge fixed per-transaction fees. In this paper, we reexamine this result in a market characterized by free entry. We find that...

In two-sided markets where the platform is composed of a set of components, a monopolist may have an incentive to foreclose competition in the complementary market. By introducing incompatibility, the monopolist can exclude its complementors, thereby capturing surplus from both sides of...

I examine the optimal licensing strategy of the owner of a proprietary technology standard in a monopolistically competitive industry. The standard owner can be either an outsider innovator or a joint venture of downstream firms. I find that (1) a simple revenue royalty replicates the integrated...

I examine firms' aftermarket behavior in the presence of myopic consumers who optimize period-by-period. Paradoxically, a monopolist's profit decreases with the percentage of myopic consumers, whereas competitive firms earn supranormal profits from myopic consumers through the strategic use of...