We examine how division managers' human capital affects internal capital allocation using a hand-collected data set of divisional managers at S&P 1,500 firms. Based on a novel measure of division-manager ability, we show that more able division managers receive substantially larger capital...

This paper focuses on the link between the three types of specificity and the complexity of outsourcing contracts because specificity is generally considered as the most important transaction cost attribute. It also integrates external uncertainty in the model. External uncertainty is a...

Business groups in emerging markets perform better than unaffiliated firms. One explanation is that business groups substitute some functions of missing institutions, for example, enforcing contracts. We investigate this by setting up a model where firms within the business group are connected...

We propose that stronger creditor rights in bankruptcy reduce corporate risk-taking. Employing country-level data, we find that strong creditor rights are associated with a greater propensity of firms to engage in diversifying mergers, and this propensity changes in response to changes in the...

The necessary investments for the modernization and rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the railway in our country, for the strategic adaptation of the railway transport, determines some particularities in the process of making the analysis of cost-profit, through some elements taken into...

Large shareholders may play an important role for firm policies and performance, but identifying an effect empirically presents a challenge due to the endogeneity of ownership structures. However, unlike other blockholders, individuals tend to hold blocks in corporations that are located close...

In this paper we show the advantages of staged investments for venture capitalists. We develop an option-pricing model that enables to evaluate the flexibility acquired by a venture capitalist when he stages his investment process. Instead of investing a fixed amount at the beginning of the...

We examine whether stock market-listed firms in the U.S. invest suboptimally due to agency costs resulting from separation of ownership and control. We derive testable predictions to distinguish between underinvestment due to rational “short-termism” and overinvestment due to “empire...

Corporations in many countries are run by controlling shareholders whose cash flow rights in the firm are substantially smaller than their control rights. This separation of ownership and control allows the controlling shareholders to pursue private benefits at the cost of minority investors by...