An important result in interest group theory and political economy is that small groups are more influential than their size would lead us to expect. In this study, we document that the opposite holds for political mobilization. Citizens are more likely to participate in elections if they belong...

Review of: Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification. By Timur Kuran. 1995. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, MA

This article analyzes the reasons why individuals oppose the siting of nuclear waste repositories close to their hometowns. In a simple model based on survey data, we show that the willingness to accept such facilities largely depends on economic criteria, namely expected economic impacts and...

Why do people frequently cooperate in defiance of their immediate incentives? One explanation is that individuals are conditionally cooperative. As an explanation of behavior in one-shot settings, such preferences require individuals to be able to discern their opponents' preferences. Using data...

We analyze the behavior of game-show contestants who play a one-shot game called Friend or Foe. While it is a weakly dominant strategy not to cooperate, almost half the contestants on the show choose to play ?friend.? Remarkably, the behavior of contestants remains uncha nged even when stakes...

The economic theory of federalism is largely built around the premise that more heterogeneous preferences result in more decentralized policy making. Despite its prominence and importance, this central tenet of economic federalism has never been empirically evaluated. This paper presents the...