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Stability and strategy‐proofness for matching with constraints : a necessary and sufficient condition
Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 2, pp. 761-793
Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching …, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional … is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011856716
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Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Doægan, Battal; Ehlers, Lars H. - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1249-1279
mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient assignments when the stability comparison is based on counting the number … stability comparison based on the set of blocking students who are involved in at least one blocking pair, show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189080
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Minimally unstable Pareto improvements over deferred acceptance
Doğan, Battal; Ehlers, Lars H. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 4, pp. 1249-1279
mechanism that is minimally unstable among efficient assignments when the stability comparison is based on counting the number … stability comparison based on the set of blocking students who are involved in at least one blocking pair, show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806473
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Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
Kamada, Yuichiro; Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) 2, pp. 761-793
Distributional constraints are common features in many real matching markets, such as medical residency matching …, school admissions, and teacher assignment. We develop a general theory of matching mechanisms under distributional … is stable and strategy-proof for the individuals. Our proof exploits a connection between a matching problem under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012010043
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Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
Fragiadakis, Daniel; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 12 (2017) 2, pp. 863-908
requirements at each Army branch in military cadet matching and diversity considerations in school choice, whereby school districts … properties. We expect the use of our mechanisms to improve the performance of matching markets with distributional constraints in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705212
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The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kesten, Onur - Abteilung "Verhalten auf Märkten", … - 2014
A particular adaptation of Gale's top trading cycles procedure to school choice, the so-called TTC mechanism, has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of Gale's original...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082718
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The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kesten, Onur - 2014
A particular adaptation of Gale's top trading cycles procedure to school choice, the so-called TTC mechanism, has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of Gale's original...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010427330
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The equitable top trading cycles mechanism for school choice
Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kesten, Onur - 2014
A particular adaptation of Gale's top trading cycles procedure to school choice, the so-called TTC mechanism, has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of Gale's original...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010429798
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Efficiency and Stability in Large Matching Markets
Che, Yeon-Koo - 2015
We study efficient and stable mechanisms in matching markets when the number of agents is large and individuals …' preferences and priorities are drawn randomly. When agents' preferences are uncorrelated, then both efficiency and stability can …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018428
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Obvious mistakes in a strategically simple college admissions environment
Shorrer, Ran I.; Sóvágó, Sándor - 2017
In a centralized marketplace that was designed to be simple, we identify participants whose choices are dominated. Using administrative data from Hungary, we show that college applicants make obvious mistakes: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver worth thousands of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011772987