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School choice with controlled choice constraints: Hard bounds versus soft bounds

Ehlers, Lars; Hafalir, Isa E.; Yenmez, M. Bumin; … - In: Journal of Economic Theory 153 (2014) C, pp. 648-683

Controlled choice over public schools attempts giving parents selection options while maintaining diversity of different student types. In practice, diversity constraints are often enforced by setting hard upper bounds and hard lower bounds for each student type. We demonstrate that, with hard...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010930799

Effective affirmative action in school choice

Yenmez, M. Bumin; Yildirim, Muhammed Ali; Hafalir, Isa Emin - In: Theoretical Economics 8 (2013) 2

action policies with celebrated matching mechanisms such as the deferred acceptance and top trading cycles algorithms …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010674220

Matching Mechanisms and Matching Quality : Evidence from a Top School in China

Wu, Binzhen - 2013

We compare competing college admission matching mechanisms that differ in preference submission timing (pre-exam, post …-exam but pre-score, or post-score) and in matching procedure (Boston (BOS) and serial dictatorship (SD) matching). Pre … or SD matching are ex-post fair and efficient, they are not so ex-ante. Instead, the mechanism with pre-exam submission …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013092566

The Core of School Choice Problems

Rong, Kang - 2020

We propose a notion of core for school choice problems. We say that a coalition of students is able to enforce a subassignment among them if, given their priorities at schools, other students together cannot exclude any of them from her assignment. An assignment is in the core if no coalition of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012838118

Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets

Kojima, Fuhito - 2007

The paper analyzes the scope for manipulation in many-to-one matching markets (college admission problems) under the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012777837

School Choice : Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms

Jaramillo, Paula - 2017

We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012955586

On the Welfare Effects of Affirmative Actions in School Choice

Liu, Yun - 2018

, and the intrinsic difficulty of embedding diversity goals into stable matching mechanisms. Under some regularity …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014135108

A new perspective on Kesten's school choice with consent idea

Tang, Qianfeng; Yu, Jingsheng - In: Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) C, pp. 543-561

We revisit the school choice problem with consent proposed by Kesten [12], which seeks to improve the efficiency of the student-optimal deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) by obtaining students' consent to give up their priorities. We observe that for students to consent, we should use their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011076678

Matching with floor constraints

Akin, Sumeyra - In: Theoretical Economics 16 (2021) 3, pp. 911-942

military cadet matching. We develop a theory of matching markets under floor constraints. We introduce a stability notion …, which we call floor respecting stability, for markets in which (hard) floor constraints must be respected. A matching is …Floor constraints are a prominent feature of many matching markets, such as medical residency, teacher assignment, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013189041

Matching with floor constraints

Akin, Sumeyra - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 3, pp. 911-942

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806304