This paper studies the impact of commodity taxes on the sustainability of collusion in imperfectly competitive markets. We consider both a Cournot and a Bertrand supergame with discounting, with collusion being supported by either grim trigger strategies or stick-and-carrot optimal punishments....

In this paper, we build a Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium of a private property productive asset oligopoly. We compare and contrast private with common property in terms of exploitation rates and social welfare, and provide a comparative dynamic analysis with respect to the number of firms in the...

Theory predicts that optimal effective corporation tax rates will be negatively related to industry specific sunk costs, and hence industry concentration. Governments should tax industries with monopolistic power softly. Evidence suggests that this Schumpeterian (1942) principle of corporate...

We derive a feedback equilibrium of a dynamic Cournot game where production requires exploitation of a renewable asset. As in the classical Cournot model, quantity-setting firms compete in the same market for a given homogeneous good. We show that, when the asset stock grows sufficiently fast,...

We propose an infinite-horizon quantity-setting differential game with learning spillovers and organizational forgetting to analyze the optimal management decisions affecting the evolution of the stock of know-how, and, in turn, the dynamics of productive efficiency. Specifically, we study the...