In exchange economies where moral hazard affects the distribution of individual risks, we study the viability of linear nonexclusive contracts. It is shown that the linearity in prices and payoffs is compatible with the presence of moral hazard when coupled with a simple participation fee. More...

This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE), and of a randomized strategy equilibrium...

This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE), and of a randomized strategy equilibrium...

This paper elucidates the conceptual role that independent randomization plays in non-cooperative game theory. In the context of large (atomless) games in normal form, we present precise formalizations of the notions of a mixed strategy equilibrium (MSE), and of a randomized strategy equilibrium...

The present paper makes a contribution to fill in a gap left open by dynamic theory and evolutionary economics as well. While the "closed loop" dynamic theory has explanation power in analyzing evolving economic systems at the price of neglecting the possible occurrence of non anticipated...

The paper considers price adjustment on the plane and derives global stability conditions for such dynamics. First, we examine the well-known Scarf Example, to obtain and analyze a global stability condition for this case. Next, for a general class of excess demand functions, a set of conditions...