We model the role of the informal credit sector in developing countries. The informational advantage of informal lenders is portrayed as the ability to monitor borrowers. Monitoring reduces the incentive problem and allows for contracts with lower collateral. This enables informal lenders to...

We develop a model that shows that asymmetric information can result in two types of credit rationing: conventional quantity rationing, and “risk rationing,” whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under high-collateral contracts that offer them lower expected well-being than a safe,...

By shrinking the available menu of loan contracts, asymmetric information can result in two types of nonprice rationing in credit markets. The first is conventional quantity rationing. The second is ‘risk rationing.’ Risk rationed agents are able to borrow, but only under relatively high...

If we understand well the individualization of land tenure rules under conditions of growing land scarcity and increased market integration, much less is known about the mode of evolution of the family farms possessing the land. Inspired by first-hand evidence from West Africa, this paper argues...

The material contained herein is supplementary to the article named in the title and published in the American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 89, Number 4, November 2007.

We analyze the individualization of farm units in Mali in the sense of a transformation of purely collective farms into mixed units in which private plots coexist with collective fields. Since a moral-hazard-in-team problem plagues production on the latter and the household head extracts his...