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In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705187
is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. Finally, we consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with … case for sequential second-price auctions, as the bids in a second-price auction do not reveal sufficient information to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015216671
is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. Finally, we consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with … case for sequential second-price auctions, as the bids in a second-price auction do not reveal sufficient information to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015216708
static settings, sequential second-price auctions cannot yield these outcomes, as they do not reveal sufficient information. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217921
-price auctions cannot yield this outcome, as these auctions do not reveal sufficient information to symmetrize different cohorts. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015222321
We model new experience goods in the context of dynamic mechanism design. These are goods for which an agent is unsure of her valuation but can learn it through consumption experience. We consider a dynamic environment with a single buyer and seller in which contracting occurs over T periods,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015266588
is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. Finally, we consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with … case for sequential second-price auctions, as the bids in a second-price auction do not reveal sufficient information to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015268575
uncertainty of type spaces. The results are illustrated in second-price auctions, first-price auctions and Bertrand duopolies. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284043
is a pivot mechanism with a reserve price. Finally, we consider sequential ascending auctions in this setting, both with … case for sequential second-price auctions, as the bids in a second-price auction do not reveal sufficient information to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005019437
We model new experience goods in the context of dynamic mechanism design. These are goods for which an agent is unsure of her valuation but can learn it through consumption experience. We consider a dynamic environment with a single buyer and seller in which contracting occurs over T periods,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619380