This study examines the relationship between a board meeting and banks performance in Africa. This paper provides insight on this question after taking into account the endogeneity of the relationship between board meetings and performance. Specifically, we use the GMM technique and a sample of...

This study examines the relationship between a board meeting and banks performance in Africa. This paper provides insight on this question after taking into account the endogeneity of the relationship between board meetings and performance. Specifically, we use the GMM technique and a sample of...

Synergy-banking management under capital regulation is done through a gluing together of lending and deposit-taking. Under this viewpoint, we argue that the cap options theory of corporate security valuation can be applied to the contingent claims of the synergy-banking firm. The equity holders...

This paper analyzes the effect of the business cycle on the regulatory capital buffer of German savings and cooperative banks in the period 1993-2003. The capital buffer is found to fluctuate anticyclically over the business cycle. The fluctuation is stronger for savings banks than for...

This paper investigates the incentives for banks to bias their internally generated risk estimates. We are able to estimate bank biases at the credit level by comparing bank-generated risk estimates within loan syndicates. The biases are positively correlated with measures of regulatory capital,...

Pierret (2015) presents empirical analysis of the solvency-liquidity nexus for the banking system, documenting that a shock to the level of banks' solvency risk is followed by lower short-term debt. Conversely, higher short-term debt Granger-causes higher solvency risk. These results point...

So far the discussion in Switzerland about the social costs and benefits of higher capital requirements resulting from the new Basel III Accord and the Swiss Too Big To Fail legislation has been heavily qualitative. This paper provides a quantitative view and estimates the long-run costs and...

We analyze shareholders' incentives to change the leverage of a firm that has already borrowed substantially. As a result of debt overhang, shareholders have incentives to resist reductions in leverage that make the remaining debt safer. This resistance is present even without any government...

We assess the influence of competition and capital regulation on the stability of the banking system. We particularly ask two questions: i) how does capital regulation affect (endogenous) entry; and ii) how do (exogenous) changes in the competitive environment affect bank monitoring choices and...