We analyze a stochastic equilibrium contract-posting model. Firms post employment contracts, wages contingent on all payoff-relevant states. Aggregate productivity is subject to persistent shocks. Both employed and unemployed workers search randomly for these contracts, and are free to quit at...

For Markovian economic models, long-run equilibria are typically identified with the stationary (invariant) distributions generated by the model. In this paper weprovide new sufficient conditions for continuity in the map from parameters to these equilibria. Several existing results are shown to...

This paper deals with a stochastic dynamic optimization problem in the context of illegal company financing. Our analysis of the usury phenomenon is conducted by searching for the best interest rate which an illegal financier should apply to a company in order to bring about the firm’s...

We consider technology choices between green and brown technologies by firms. We use insights from complexity theory and also take account of true uncertainty in designing public policy. The green technology offers relatively higher returns to scale from adoption, and there are type-contingent...

We consider firms' choices between a clean technology that benefits, and a dirty technology that harms, the environment. Green firms are more suited to the clean, and brown firms are more suited to the dirty technology. We use a model derived from complexity theory that takes account of true...

The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments of stochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal form games that arise. It is shown that many of the “folk...

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in...