Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox (1978) has been justification for lack of antitrust behavior for over four decades. His test essentially asks if consumers are harmed by the pricing practices of the firm in the market in which they purchase the good or service. Even if these firms are monopoly or...

This paper investigates the cost efficiency and competitive behaviour of the non-life – or property and casualty – insurance market in the Netherlands over the period 1995-2012. We focus on the 2006 health care reform, where public health care insurance has been included in the non-life...

Throughout the years, much intellectual energy has been invested into drawing the line between being anti-competitive by object or by effect, ignoring that an infringement must also be appreciable. Most likely based on a presumption that this is no longer a separate requirement, but part of...

The so-called excess-entry theorem (Mankiw and Whinston 1986, Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987) establishes conditions guaranteeing that more firms enter a homogeneous Cournotoligopoly in equilibrium than a benevolent government prefers. We generalise the approach and analyse the behaviour of a...

I study optimal information provision by a search goods seller. While the seller controls a consumer's pre-search information, which decides whether she will engage in costly search for the product, he cannot control her post-search information because the consumer would inevitably learn the...

Under EU competition law it is prohibited to conclude anti-competitive agreements. If found, such conduct warrants fines in the millions. How-ever, little guidance on what to consider restrictive practices are available from the relevant statute, referring the matter to case law. Here a pattern...

This article provides an overview of the competitive issues surrounding online platforms. The general theme is that while much has been made of the structural features of online platforms there is little hard evidence that these are durable monopolies. Nonetheless, there are concerns about the...

We build a model of tacit collusion between firms that operate in multiple markets to study the effects of trade costs. A key feature of the model is that cartel discipline is endogenous. Thus, markets that appear segmented are strategically linked via the incentive compatibility constraint....