A durable good monopolist faces a continuum of heterogeneous customers who make purchase decisions by comparing present and expected price-quality offers. The monopolist designs a sequence of price-quality menus to segment the market. We consider the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) of a game...

We consider a non-durable good monopoly that collects data on its customers in order to profile them and subsequently practice price discrimination on returning customers. The monopolist’s price discrimination scheme is leaky, in the sense that an endogenous fraction of consumers choose to...

Using a Markov-perfect equilibrium model, we show that the use of customer data to practice intertemporal price discrimination will improve monopoly profit if and only if information precision is higher than a certain threshold level. This U-shaped relationship lends support to a popular view...

We present a model of market hyper-segmentation, where a monopolist acquires within a short time all information about the preferences of consumers who purchase its vertically differentiated products within a given period. The firrm offers a new price/quality schedule after each commitment...

In this paper, we analyze the static interaction in prices between two newspapers that compete with each other in the circulation and in the advertising markets. We exploit the two-sided nature of the newspaper industry to analyze a demand-side effect that generates an endogenous mechanism of...