This paper studies corporatism as the outcome of bargaining between the government and a representative labor union. When negotiations between these two parties only relate to macroeconomic stabilization, we show that corporatism can never be beneficial to both parties. As corporatist policies...

In this paper we propose a new approach for the design of pharmaceutical copayments. We departure from the standard efficiency argument that advocates for copayments that are decreasing in the health benefits of the patients in order to discipline consumption. Under our approach, copayments are...

Consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions precludes transferable utility (a property we call “Almost TU”). We show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to...

We consider an n-person economy in which efficiency is independent of distribution but the cardinal properties of the agents’ utility functions preclude transferable utility (a property we call “Almost TU”). We show that Almost TU is a necessary and sufficient condition for all agents to...

We study the problem of allocating a bundle of perfectly divisible private goods from an axiomatic point of view, in situations where compensations can be made through monetary transfers. The key property we impose on the allocation rule requires that no agent should be able to gain by...

This study uses a multiagent system to investigate how sealed-bid auction results vary across twodimensional value signals from pure private to pure common value. I find that several auction outcomes are significantly nonlinear across the two-dimensional value signals. As the common value...

Consider a two-person economy in which allocative efficiency is independent of distribution but cardinality of the agents' utility functions precludes transferable utility. I show that both agents either benefit or lose with any change of production possibilities under the Nash Bargaining and...

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced...