En este documento se describen cuatro mecanismos de riesgo compartido entre las aseguradoras y el Estado, que complementan la actual forma de pago por capitación en el sistema de salud colombiano. Estos mecanismos moderan los incentivos que las aseguradoras tienen a seleccionar los afiliados...

Health insurance affects the rate at which individuals visit hospitals and emergency departments (EDs). We identify the causal effect of losing health insurance using a regression discontinuity design. We compare individuals just before and after their twenty third birthday, which insurers have...

Substantial uncertainty exists regarding the causal effect of health insurance on the utilization of care. We exploit a sharp change in insurance coverage rates that results from young adults "aging out" of their parents' insurance plans to estimate the effect of insurance coverage on the...

This paper discusses suitable ways to implement Health Savings Accounts (HSAs) in German Statutory Health Insurance (SHI) building on the introduction of so-called Flexible Health Plans (“Wahltarife”) according to Sec. 53 para. 1 Social Security Code V in 2007, which allows insurers in SHI...

Das Krankenversicherungssystem in Deutschland ist seit Jahren in der Kritik. Reformbedarf besteht sowohl bei der Gesetzlichen als auch bei der Privaten Krankenversicherung. Ist ein einheitlicher Versicherungsmarkt die Lösung? Peter Oberender und Jürgen Zerth, Universität Bayreuth, sehen in...

In times of increasing health care expenditure and insufficient cover provided by publicly financed health systems additional, alternative methods of health care financing become more and more considerable. The purpose of the paper is to present the concept of Medical Savings Accounts (MSAs) and...

We present a graphical framework for analyzing both theoretical and empirical work on selection in insurance markets. We begin by using this framework to review the "textbook" adverse selection environment and its implications for insurance allocation, social welfare, and public policy. We then...

One of the major problems of the U.S. health insurance market is that it leaves individuals exposed to reclassification risk. Reclassification risk arises because the health conditions of individuals evolve over time, while a typical health insurance contract only lasts for one year. A change in...

In this paper, we want to characterize the optimal health insurance contract with adverse selection and moral hazard. We assume that policyholders differ by the permanent health status loss and choose an unobservable preventive effort in order to reduce the probability of illness which is...