Misrepresenting private information is often costly. This paper studies a model of strategic information transmission based on Crawford and Sobel (1982)(CS), but with a signaling dimension where there is a convex cost of misreporting. I identify a simple condition, called No Incentive to...

We study the evolution of cooperation in public goods games on the square lattice, focusing on the effects that are brought about by different sizes of groups where individuals collect their payoffs and search for potential strategy donors. We find that increasing the group size does not...

Various approaches used in Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) to model endogenously determined interactions between agents are discussed. This concerns models in which agents not only (learn how to) play some (market or other) game, but also (learn to) decide with whom to do that (or not).

This chapter reviews recent experimental data testing game theory and behavioral models that have been inspired to explain those data. The models fall into four groups: in cognitive hierarchy or level- k models, the assumption of equilibrium is relaxed by assuming agents have beliefs about other...

We build an analytical framework to model the strategic interactions between a firm and hackers. Firms invest in security to defend against cyber attacks by hackers. Hackers choose an optimal attack, and they share information with each other about the firm's vulnerabilities. Each hacker prefers...

We contrast a standard deterministic signaling game with a variant where the signal-generating mechanism is subject to stochastic perturbations. In the theoretical part, we obtain a unique equilibrium with stochastic signals. This equilibrium is separating and has intuitive comparative-static...

The efficiency of institutionalized punishment is studied by evaluating the stationary states in the spatial public goods game comprising unconditional defectors, cooperators, and cooperating pool-punishers as the three competing strategies. Fine and cost of pool-punishment are considered as the...

The promise of punishment and reward in promoting public cooperation is debatable. While punishment is traditionally considered more successful than reward, the fact that the cost of punishment frequently fails to offset gains from enhanced cooperation has lead some to reconsider reward as the...