We study a labor markets described by a many-to-one matching market with externalities among firms in which each firm's preferences depend not only on workers whom it hires, but also on workers whom its rival firms hire. We define a new stability concept called weak stability, and investigate...

We analyze a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of an extensive game with perfect information induced by the firm-oriented deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm in a one-to-one matching market between firms and workers. When no agents are strategic, the resulting outcome is the firm-optimal stable...

We consider a multilateral matching market, where two or more agents can engage in a joint venture via multilateral contracts. Possible joint ventures are exogenously given. We study four stability concepts: strong group stability, stability, setwise stability, and weak setwise stability. We...

We show that the core of a generalized assignment problem satisfies two types of stability properties. First, the core is the unique stable set defined using the weak domination relation when outcomes are restricted to individually rational and pairwise feasible ones. Second, the core is the...