We examine whether disagreement between managers and investors relates to the informativeness of bidder returns around acquisition announcements. We predict that greater disagreement about the merits of an acquisition creates uncertainty about investors' revaluation of acquiring firms, making...

Contrary to past literature, active ownership, defined as all officers and directors of the target firm, has no association with target returns. Rather, we find that inside (managerial) ownership has a positive relation with target returns, whereas active-outside (non-managing director)...

CEOs have a potential conflict of interest when their company is acquired: they can bargain to be retained by the acquirer and for private benefits rather than for a higher premium to be paid to the shareholders. We investigate the determinants of target CEO retention by the acquirer and whether...

Contrary to past literature, ownership defined as "all officers and directors" of the target firm has no association with target returns. Rather, we find that inside (managerial) ownership has a positive relation with target returns, whereas active-outside (non-managing director) ownership has a...

Using the longest event window, we find that public target shareholders receive a 63% (14%) higher premium when the acquirer is a public firm rather than a private equity firm (private operating firm). The premium difference holds with the usual controls for deal and target characteristics, and...