This paper analyzes a model of preemptive jump bidding in private value takeover auctions with entry costs. It shows that when the second bidder owns a fraction of the target firm preemptive jump bidding leads to a higher social surplus, improves the expected profit of both bidders and reduces...

This paper analyzes the preemptive jump bidding equilibrium in takeover auctions when the acquisition of the target firm by one of the bidders may affect the profit of the other bidder. It shows that such externality has no effect on the preemption rate but affects the size of the jump bid...

This paper presents a model of preemptive bidding in takeover auctions with toeholds. It shows that when the first bidder owns a fraction of the target firm he is more likely to deter competition and a smaller jump bid is required to do so. It also shows that in the presence of the toehold, the...

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding.  The sequential process is always more efficient.  But...

We compare the two most common bidding processes for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly to buyers. In an auction all entry decisions are made prior to any bidding. In a sequential bidding earlier entrants can make bids before later entrants choose whether to compete....

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...

We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But...