Given the framework introduced by Dutta and Sen (2012), this paper offers a comprehensive analysis of (Nash) implementation with partially honest agents when there are three or more participants. First, it establishes a condition which is necessary and sufficient for implementation. Second, it...

This paper models labor supply decisions of fathers and mothers from Nuevo Leon State and examines the welfare levels that both could face under different hours of paid work. Bargaining models are applied and analyzed using game theory. It is adapted a methodology to separate goods consumed by...

In this paper we consider dynamic processes, in repeated games, that are subject to the natural informational restriction of uncoupledness. We study the almost sure convergence to Nash equilibria, and present a number of possibility and impossibility results. Basically, we show that if in...

I model a single-club economy with heterogeneous consumers as an aggregative game. I give a sufficient condition, normality of demand for the club good in full income, for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilbrium by the Cornes-Hartley (2007) method. Then, confining attention to club...