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Political Influence in Multi-Choice Institutions: Cyclicity, Anonymity and Transitivity

Pongou, Roland; Tchantcho, Bertrand; Diffo Lambo, Lawrence - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

We study political influence in institutions where members choose from among several options their levels of support to a collective goal, these individual choices determining the degree to which the goal is reached. Influence is assessed by newly defined binary relations, each of which compares...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008555439

Bayesian Nash equilibria with a provision point : an experimental test

Johnson, Lowell R. - 1997

This paper extends theory and experimentation in the context of two parties in a group who contribute to a public good with a provision point. This study analyzes the voluntary contributions game in which a public good is provided if and only if the sum of contributions meets or exceeds a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011577030

A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE OF STATISTICAL TO STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA OF MARKET GAMES

TSOMOCOS, DIMITRIOS P.; VOLIOTIS, DIMITRIS - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 11 (2009) 04, pp. 479-489

information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475658

ON COOPERATIVE GAMES RELATED TO MARKET SITUATIONS AND AUCTIONS

BRANZEI, RODICA; FRAGNELLI, VITO; MECA, ANA; TIJS, STEF - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 11 (2009) 04, pp. 459-470

We consider a market situation with two corners. One corner consists of a single seller with one object, and the other corner consists of potential buyers who all want the object. We suppose that the valuations of the object for the different buyers are known by all of them. Then two types of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475661

A NOTE ON THE COMPUTATION OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE FOR VON NEUMANN–MORGENSTERN MARKET GAMES

FRAGNELLI, VITO; MECA, ANA - In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR) 12 (2010) 03, pp. 287-291

We consider a von Neumann–Morgenstern market game and present a simple expression for the Shapley value via decomposition as the difference of an airport game and an extended airport game. The resulting formula has a useful interpretation for designing an allocation procedure among the agents.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008853037

It's good weather for more government : the effect of weather on fiscal policy

Souza, Gustavo Moreira de - 2022

I show that the weather condition on election day affects future fiscal policy. When it rains during state elections, there is an increase in the relative income of voters, which is followed by an increase in expenditure and debt. The increase in expenditure is directed towards a larger police...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013417291

A note on the equilibrium properties of locational sorting models

Bayer, Patrick J.; Timmins, Christopher - 2003

attributes of other individuals or firms that choose the same or nearby locations in equilibrium. The main goal of this paper is … to develop the equilibrium properties of a broadly applicable and readily estimable class of sorting models that allow … that a unique equilibrium is more likely to obtain (i) the smaller are any agglomeration effects, (ii) the larger are the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011608986

A Note on the Equilibrium Properties of Locational Sorting Models

Bayer, Patrick J.; Timmins, Christopher - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014076020

Plaintiffs exploiting plaintiffs

Stremitzer, Alexander - 2008

We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010383020

The behavioural mechanisms of voluntary cooperation in WEIRD and non-WEIRD societies

Weber, Till O.; Beranek, Benjamin; Gächter, Simon; … - 2021

We provide a framework to uncover behavioural mechanisms driving potential cross-societal differences in voluntary cooperation. We deploy our framework in one-shot public goods experiments in the US and the UK, and in Morocco and Turkey. We find that cooperation is higher in the US and UK than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012549763