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Job search, human capital and wage inequality

Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos - 2012

This paper constructs and quantitatively assesses an equilibrium search model with on-the- job search and general human … dispersed because of search frictions and workers' productivity differentials. Using the (log) wage variance decomposition … productivities. Among medium skilled workers, productivity differentials and search frictions are equally important. The model …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331222

Why Do Russian Firms Use Fixed-Term and Agency Work Contracts?

Smirnykh, Larisa; Wörgötter, Andreas - 2013

This study looks into the use of fixed term contracts and agency work in Russia during and shortly after the crisis 2009-10 with the help of an enterprise survey. The results of variance analysis show that the use of fixed-term or agency work contracts is not uniform across sectors, size and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331420

Preferences and skills of Indian public sector teachers 2u<

Fagernäs, Sonja; Pelkonen, Panu - In: IZA Journal of Labor & Development 1 (2012), pp. 1-31

With a sample of 700 future public sector primary teachers in India, a Discrete Choice Experiment is used to measure job preferences, particularly regarding location. General skills are also tested. Urban origin teachers and women are more averse to remote locations than rural origin teachers...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331938

Reforming an insider-outsider labor market: The Spanish experience

Benrolila, Samuel; Dolado, Juan J.; Jimeno, Juan F. - In: IZA Journal of European Labor Studies 1 (2012), pp. 1-29

This paper presents a case study on reforming a very dysfunctional labor market with a deep insider-outsider divide, namely the Spanish case. We show how a dual market, with permanent and temporary employees, makes real reform much harder, and leads to purely marginal changes that do not alter...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010331954

Managerial control inside the firm

Hirota, Shinichi; Kawamura, Kohei - 2005

This paper proposes an implicit control mechanism of managers inside the firm. We argue that the need to motivate workers may make it beneficial for a self-interested, short-sighted manager to pursue long-run viability of the firm. When the firm is in a stable environment, this implicit control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332257

Dynamically sabotage-proof tournaments

Ishida, Junichiro - 2012

This paper explores the consequences of sabotage for the design of incentive contracts. The possibility of sabotage gives rise to a dynamic concern, similar to the Ratchet effect, which distorts the agents' incentives. We first show that the mere possibility of sabotage may make it impossible to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332325

Dynamic Contracts and Learning by Doing

Prat, Julien - 2014

This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333325

A Competitive Model of Worker Replacement and Wage Rigidity

Snell, Andy; Thomas, Jonathan; Wang, Zhewei - 2014

We adapt the models of Menzio and Moen (2010) and Snell and Thomas (2010) to consider a labour market in which firms can commit to wage contracts but cannot commit not to replace incumbent workers. Workers are risk averse, so that there exists an incentive for firms to smooth wages. Real wages...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333415

On and Off Contract Remedies

Brooks, Richard; Stremitzer, Alexander - 2009

A party dissatisfied with the contractual performance of a counterparty is typically able to pursue a variety of legal recourses. Within this apparent variety lurk two fundamental alternatives. The aggrieved party may (i) 'affirm' the contract and seek money damages or specific performance; or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333753

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; Macleod, W. Bentley - 2011

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333911