This paper sets up a general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model for two integrated countries that are similar in all respects except of the prevailing labor market institutions. In one country, the labor market is perfectly competitive, while in the other country labor unions are active in a...

This paper sets up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with two countries that differ in the centralization of union wage setting. Being interested in the consequences of openness, we show that, in the short-run, trade increases welfare and employment in both locations, and it raises...

We develop a simple framework to show the effects of trade cost reduction on unionized wage, employment and domestic welfare when a domestic firm strategically chooses the amount of formal in-house production and subcontracting to the informal sector. We show that a lower trade cost increases...

This paper sets up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with unionized labor markets. By accounting for productivity differences, the model features profit and wage differentials across industries. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on employment, welfare, and...

This paper studies the relationship between wage negotiations and the mode of foreign market penetration in a general equilibrium framework. We analyze the incentives of firms to set up a foreign production facility for improving their bargaining position vis-à-vis local unions. This renders...

We find that trade unions have a rational incentive to oppose the adaption of labour-saving technology when labour demand is inelastic and unions care much for employment relative to wages. Trade liberalisation typically increases trade union technology opposition. These conclusions are reached...

We show the effects of trade cost reduction in the presence of a domestic firm's strategic output allocation between formal in-house production and subcontracting to the informal sector. Considering a one-way trade, we show that trade cost reduction increases the in-house unionised wage,...

Can lobbying internalize cross-national externalities? This paper investigates this in a two-country economy where governments regulate labour markets through national labour standards, but are subject to lobbying. We study four different lobbying architectures and show that cross-national...

This paper analyzes competition for capital between welfare-maximizing gov- ernments in a framework with agglomeration tendencies and asymmetric union- ization. We find that a unionized country's government finds it optimal to use tax policy to induce industry to relocate towards a location with...

We find that trade unions have a rational incentive to oppose the adoption of labour-saving technology when labour demand is inelastic and unions care much for employment relative to wages. Trade liberalization typically increases trade union technology opposition. These conclusions are reached...