We investigate the nature of market failure in a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970) where identical cohorts of a durable good enter the market over time. In the dynamic model, equilibria with qualitatively different properties emerge. Typically, in equilibria of the dynamic model, sellers with...

We investigate the nature of the adverse selection problem in a market for adurable goodwhere trading and entry of new buyers and sellers takes place in continuoustime. In thecontinuous time model equilibria with properties that are qualitativelydifferent from thestatic equilibria, emerge....

This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using thefact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are...

This paper develops one possible argument why auctioning licenses to op-erate in an aftermarket may lead to higher prices in the aftermarket comparedto a more random allocation mechanism. Key ingredients in the argumentare differences in firms' risk attitudes and the fact that future market...

We take a dynamic perspective on insurance markets under adverseselection and study a generalized Rothschildand Stiglitz model where agents may differ with respect to theaccidental probability and their expenditure levels incase an accident occurs. We investigate the nature of dynamicinsurance...