An extended small open economy model is developed and used to examine the effect of trade on the illicit expropriation of incomes and the provision of legal services. We derive conditions under which trade liberalization will reduce expropriation activities. We also derive sufficient conditions...

We examine the incentives for integration between two nations of different sizes in a set up similar to Alesina and Spolaore (2003): individuals are indexed by location, each nation (comprising of individuals) is an interval, and the public good in each nation is provided from its capital -...

Academics and regulators have given significant attention to the impact of institutional investors on the companies in which they invest. Some are concerned that the institutional investors act as common owners. But in their active ownership policies institutional investors often say they are...

This paper analyzes the optimality of policy specifications used to regulate the acquisition and operation of local firms by multinational enterprises (MNE). We emphasize the consequence of such regulation on the price of the domestic firm in the market for corporate control. We show that it is...

We revisit the classic comparison between Bertrand and Cournot outcomes in a mixed market with private and public firms. A departure from the standard setting, i.e., one where all firms maximize profits, provides new insights. A welfare-maximizing public firm's price is strictly lower while its...

In developing economies firm strategy is directed more often at governments than at other competing firms. As an initial step towards modeling such interactions, this paper considers a situation where government confronts a monopoly. The latter chooses price and maximizes profit, and the former...

Tension between efficiency and equity is fundamental to every economy. Historical differences between groups translate into inequality in skills and hence earnings. Measures to correct inequalities affect incentives and misallocate talent, therefore compromising efficiency. This paper examines...

We examine how trade liberalization affects South's incentive to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) in a North-South duopoly model where a low-cost North firm competes with a high-cost South firm in the South market. The extent of effective cost difference between North and South depends...

When firms form an alliance, it often involves one firm acquiring an equity stake in its alliance partner. Such an alliance weakens competition, but induces knowledge transfer between partner firms. We explore oligopoly models that capture the link between knowledge transfer and partial equity...