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Analyzing Vertical Mergers with Auctions Upstream

Podwol, Joseph; Raskovich, Alexander - 2022

We develop a model of vertical mergers with open auctions upstream. This setting may be appropriate for industries …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014082925

Testing for Collusion in Asymmetric First-Price Auctions

Aryal, Gaurab; Gabrielli, M. Florencia - 2014

This paper proposes a two step procedure to detect collusion in asymmetric first-price procurement (auctions). First …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014168325

Allocations and Price Trends in Sequential Auctions under Complete Information with Symmetric Bidders

Jeddy, Mohamed; Larue, Bruno; Gervais, Jean-philippe - In: Economics Bulletin 30 (2010) 1, pp. 429-436

We analyze sequential second-price auctions under complete information involving two or more bidders with similar …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008562873

Controlling collusion in auctions: The Role of ceilings and reserve prices

Chowdhury, Prabal Roy - Indian Statistical Institute - 2007

We examine a simple model of collusion under a single-object secondprice auction. Under the appropriate parameter conditions, in particular as long as collusion is neither too easy, nor too difficult, we find that the optimal policy involves both an effective ceiling, as well as a reserve price...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004979303

Salvaging The Linkage Principle In Private-Value Auction For A Single Object

Chakraborty, Indranil - In: Economics Bulletin 4 (2005) 4, pp. 1-5

There are a number of examples in the auction literature (Perry and Reny, 1999, and Krishna, 2002) where releasing the seller's private information can lead to a lowering of expected revenue. On the other hand, releasing information always increases welfare. Levin and Smith (1994) point out that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005181973

Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

Klemperer, Paul - EconWPA - 1999

a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), 1999.) We begin with the … most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and … number of bidders, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, payments for quality …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005413297

Optimal nondiscriminatory auctions with favoritism

Arozamena, Leandro; Shunda, Nicholas; Weinschelbaum, … - In: Economics Bulletin 34 (2014) 1, pp. 252-262

In many auction settings, there is favoritism: the seller's welfare depends positively on the utility of a subset of potential bidders. However, laws or regulations may not allow the seller to discriminate among bidders. We find the optimal nondiscriminatory auction in a private value,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010741269

Bidding behaviours in ebay auctions: secret reservation price and endogenous entry

Jiao, Feng - In: Economics Bulletin 31 (2011) 2, pp. 21-21

This paper analyzes the secret reservation price in eBay auctions. Under the assumptions of secret and public …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629638

Salvaging The Linkage Principle In Private-Value Auction For A Single Object

Chakraborty, Indranil - In: Economics Bulletin 4 (2005) 4, pp. 1-5

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010629873

Auctions with a random number of identical bidders

Haviv, Moshe; Milchtaich, Igal - In: Economics Letters 114 (2012) 2, pp. 143-146

value multiple item auctions with a random number of bidders, who only seek one of the identical items and have the same …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572235