We study experimentally how the network structure and length of pre-play communication affect behavior and outcome in a multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network and time effects is more subtle. Under each time...

In many real world negotiations, from wage contract bargaining to product liability disputes, the bargaining parties often interact repeatedly and have the option of seeking outside judgement. This paper studies a model of repeated bargaining with a third party to analyze how and why bargaining...

We study dynamic market competition between a monopoly incumbent and an entrant experimenting with disruptive innovation. The monopolist can only pursue the uncertain innovation if it buys the disruptor, who is more efficient and privately knows its ability. Mergers generate synergies. We...

Korean Abstract: 본 연구는 특허 인용 자료를 사용하여 일본, 한국, 대만으로부터 중국으로 향한 지식 전파(knowledge spillover)의 지형도를 분석하였다. 1976년에서 2017년까지 미국 특허청에서 승인된 네 국가의 특허 자료가...

We analyze cross-country trends in several aspects of technological progress over the period of 1980-2011 by examining citations data from almost 4 million utility patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). Our estimation results on patent quality and citation lags relative...

We introduce knowledge spillovers in a model of innovation competition a la Federico et al. (2017) and Denicolo and Polo (2018), which otherwise features horizontal mergers that harm innovation due to the business stealing effect. With knowledge spillovers, competition discourages investment in...

We introduce knowledge spillovers in a model of innovation competition à la Federico et al. (2017) and Denicolò and Polo (2018), which otherwise features horizontal mergers that harm innovation due to the business stealing effect. With knowledge spillovers, competition discourages investment...

This paper considers a simple model of zero-sum conflict between two players (e.g., territorial dispute) in which costly actions (e.g., terrorism) are available to one side. We identify how reputation effects shape the outcome of such conflict. A small prior of fanatic commitment type induces...

This paper constructs and analyzes a simple dynamic litigation game in which two identical plaintiffs face the decision when to sue against a single defendant. The game features a property that the precedent effect from a prior litigation engenders a free-riding opportunity. We fully...

Even with complete information, two-person bargaining can generate a large number of equilibria, involving disagreements and inefficiencies, in (i) negotiation games where disagreement payoffs are endogenously determined (Busch and Wen, 1995) and (ii) costly bargaining games where there are...